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MARTIN CARRIER
CHANGING LAWS AND SHIFTING CONCEPTS
On the Nature and Impact of Incommensurability
Abstract . "Semantic incommensurability", i.e., non-translatabilityofconcepts taken from different theories,
is at the focus of the argument. 1 attempt to give a rational reconstruction of the notion underlying the
writings of Feyerabend and the later Kuhn. 1 claim that such a coherent notion can be identified and that
relevant instances exist. Incommensurability is brought about by theoretical incompatibility. The translation
failure between incommensurable concepts arises from the impossibility ofjointly fulfilling two conditions
of adequacy that the context theory of meaning places an translations. Potential conceptual analogs either
fail to preserve the conditions ofapplication or to reproduce the relevant inferential relations. This feature
turns out tobe correlated with a cross-classification ofthe pertinent scientific kinds. These relations between
incommensurable concepts are sufficient tot making an empirical comparison ofthe claims couched in these
concepts possible.
1. INTRODUCTION
Incommensurability is among the catchwords of later 20th century philosophy of
science. The notion of incommensurability in the non-geometrical sense relevant here
was simultaneously introduced by Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul K. Feyerabend in 1962
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 103; Feyerabend, 1962, p. 58). Kuhn conceived of incommensurability
as a contrast between paradigms or comprehensive theoretical traditions that transcends
mere incompatibility. The adoptiert of a new paradigm entails the restructuring, as it
were, of the relevant universe of discourse; the adherents of the two paradigms tend to
talk past one another. In particular, incommensurability is intended to express that, firnt,
disparate concepts are employed in each of the theories at hand, second, distinct
problems are tackled, third, the suggested problem solutions are evaluated according to
different standards, and finally, perceptions are structured differently (Kuhn, 1962, pp.
103-110, 148-150). Feyerabend, by contrast, focused an the "inexplicability", that is,
the non-translatability of a term taken from one theory into the conceptual framework
of another one incompatible with the first.
While the initial use of the term "incommensurability" varied significantly, it was
subsequently restricted to denote the non-translatability of statements from different,
strongly contrasting theories. In the following 1 exclusively address this more limited
notion of incommensurability that is sometimes called "semantic incommensurability".
In his later years. Kuhn attempted to trace incommensurability back to dranging
assumptions about what is alike or what is of the Same kind. Incommensurability was
supposed to represent a translation failure resulting frorn conflicting structures of kinds;
scientific, natural, or otherwise.
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My aim is to give a systematic reconstruction of the nature and impact of
incommensurability. The relevant notion is the one entertained by Feyerabend and the
later Kulm. Underlying the conception of incommensurability is the theoretical context
account ofineaning which both authors adopted for explaining the meaning of scientific
terms. My "rational reconstruction" of incommensurability proceeds from this context
account as the central premise. For reasons to be explained later, 1 do not follow Kuhn
in regarding incompatible structures of scientific kinds as the origin of incommensur-
ability. Rather, shifting taxonomies are construed as a derivative feature that ultimately
arises from a substantial alteration ofthe relevant theories. The adoption ofa System of
laws entails assumptions as to what is alike and what is not.
In particular, 1 try to show, first, that incommensurability can be reconstructed
coherently an the basis of the context account. Incommensurability is presented as a
consequence of this semantic theory along with the historical observation that
substantial theoretical revisions occur indeed. That is, incommensurability qualifies as
a sensible notion. Second, 1 defend the coherence of the notion of incommensurability
by presenting relevant examples. My chief case concerns the non-translatability of the
concept of "phlogiston" into the conceptual framework of the succeeding oxygen
theory. This presentation is intended to further buttress the claim that incommensur-
ability is real and instantiated. Third, 1 explore the impact of incommensurability an
empirical comparability. Incommensurability was perceived in some quarters as a major
threat to the possibility of rational theory evaluation. My aim is to dispel such worries.
Incommensurable theories admit of empirical comparison. The argument proceeds an
the basis of the semantic principles adopted by Kuhn and Feyerabend. That is, given
their own linguistic approach, incommensurability does not issue in a breakdown of
comparing empirical achievements of the theories in question. Empirical comparison
does not require translation and remains largely unaffected by incommensurability.'
2. MEANING, INFERENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT
The context theory of meaning or inferential role semantics has grown out of aphoristic
remarks of the later Wittgenstein to the effect that the use ofa concept determines its
meaning (Wittgenstein, 1953, § 43). This use is fixed in turn by the relations the concept
exhibits to other concepts, that is, by its conceptual integration. To specify the meaning
of an expression is to sketch the role it plays in the relevant linguistic corrununity.
Wilfrid Sellars and Norwood Hanson were the key figures in transforming Witt-
genstein's aphorisms into a philosophical theory. Following Wittgenstein, Sellars
assumes that the linguistic role of an expression is detetmined by rules; meaning is
established by a system of rules. Sellars' innovation concerns the invocation of
"inferences" for characterizing meaning. Such "inference rules" license the transitions
between the application of predicates or the acceptance of sentences. The meaning of
a linguistic expression is captured by the entirety of those relations to other such
expressions that are deemed legitimate in the pertinent linguistic community.
For instance, it is part of the meaning of color terms that the predicate "x is red" is
implied by "x is scarlet", and implies "x is colored" and "x is not green". Likewise,
application of the predicate "r is jealous" implies "x is human" and "r is sexually
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active", whereas the predicate "x was founded in 1214" (which is assumed to truthfully
apply to the city of Bielefeld) implies "x is not sexually active" (which indeed holds of
the just mentioned entity). These examples show that the relevant inferences are not
generally part of formal logic. Rather, informal, content guided connections are at the
primary focus. In the case of scientific concepts, nomological, i.e., factual, relations
contribute to their meaning. The transition from the predicate "x is a magnet" to the
predicate "x aligns itself in the north-south direction if suspended freely" isjustified by
laws of nature (along with assumptions concerning boundary conditions). Consider-
ations of this sort show that the theoretical context ofa tenn is not neatly divided into
semantic and factual components (as suggested by the traditional analytic-synthetic
distinction). Rather, the context theory is tied up with semantic holism (to variable
degrees, depending an the version under consideration). In sum, laws and theories
supply a concept with a network of relations to other concepts; they provide the context
of inferential rules that fixes the use of a linguistic item and determines its meaning.
Meaning is dependent an theory or an the pertinent System of beliefs (Hanson, 1958,
chapters 11-111, Sellars, 1979, pp. 121-122; Churchland, 1979, pp. 46-49; Marras,
1992, pp. 713-715).
Kuhn favors a semantic approach of this sort. He claims that "knowing what a word
means is knowing how to use it for communication" (Kuhn, 1989, p. 12) and Stresses
the holistic nature of meaning. Words usually do not have meaning separately;
consequently, changing the usage of a term has ramifications as to the meaning of
associated concepts (ibid.). In addition, the rules goveming the use of scientific con-
cepts are the laws of the pertinent theories. The meaning of the term "mass" is acquired
along with Newton's Second Law or, alternatively, with the law of gravitation. The
concepts are learned along with the theory itself (see Kuhn, 1989, pp. 15-20; 1983, pp.
576-577; 1987, p. 8; 1989, pp. 15-20; see Irzik & Grünberg, 1995, pp. 297-298).
Feyerabend likewise commits himself to the context account. He endorses the view
that "the meaning of every term we use depends upon the theoretical context in which
it occurs. Words do not `mean' something in isolation; they obtain their meanings by
being part ofa theoretical System." (Feyerabend, 1965a, p. 180) Theories thus circum-
scribe guidelines for the use of the concepts featuring in their own principles and
theorems. These lawful relations contribute to establishing the meaning of the relevant
concepts. Nomological generalizations add to the meaning of the tenns employed to
express the content of these generalizations (Feyerabend, 1962, pp. 76-81; see also
Papineau, 1979, pp. 36-45; Sankey, 1994, pp. 6-10).
3. MEANING VARIANCE AND INCOMMENSURABILITY
The context theory entails that a theoretical change in science brings meaning variance
of the affected concepts in its train . One of Kuhn's most prominent historical claims is
that science indeed develops sometimes through stages of significant and deep reaching
conceptual and theoretical alteration . This view finds its most prominent expression in
Kuhn's characterization of scientific revolutions . Kuhnian revolutions are conceived as
non-cumulative transitions . They do not involve the sustained elaboration and expansion
of an accepted conceptual framework . On the contrary , the framework is abandoned and
replaced by a disparate one. In the course ofa revolution , accepted problem solutions
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and alleged theoretical achievements are taken back and supplanted by a theoretical
treatment of a different kind. A scientific revolution ä la Kuhn involves the revocation
of fundamental principles of a discipline and their replacement by disparate ones.
Furthermore , the disparity between pre - and post-revolutionaryprinciples prohibits any
smooth integration of the former into the framework of the latter . As a result of the
fundamental divergence between them, the pre-revolutionary theory cannot be
reconstructed as the limiting case of the post-revolutionary one (Kuhn , 1962, chapters
VIII-X). In the same vein, Feyerabend emphasizes the deep reaching rupture as to
concepts and content between earlier and later theories of the same domain. Preceding
accounts are not rectified in detail but preserved in principle; rather , they are typically
completely set aside and supplanted by their successors . Scientific change involves
profound shifts in formalism and ontology (Feyerabend , 1962, pp . 44-45).
Meaning variance, as generated by theoretical alteration , leads naturally to the idea
of untranslatability . Feyerabend ' s example is the failure to fit the notion of"impetus"
into Newtonian mechanics . The conception of impetus was part of late medieval
physical theory. The underlying idea was that all bodies by their nature tend to assume
a state of rest and that, consequently , every movement requires the enduring action of
a force . This force need not be external , it may as well be "impressed" in the body. The
thrown stone continues to pursue its path even after the contact with the hand of the
thrower is lost and no other external Force is effective in the direction of motion
. In such
cases, it is the impressed force or impetus that acts as a kind of internal motor which
propels the body against its intrinsic resistance to motion . The impetus thereby
increasingly exhausts itself so that it is insufficient for continuing the motion
undiminishedly and only retards the body's slowing down . The intensity of a body's
impetus was estimated by the product of its weight and velocity. This empirical measure
of impetus is conspicuously dose to that of the Newtonian concept of momentum (i.e.,
mass times velocity) which appears to make the two natural candidates for a translation.
However , as Feyerabend argues, this perfimctory similarity veils a fundamental
divergence . Its root is the Newtonian law of inertia which conflicts with the privilege
impetus physics confers an the state of rest . The Newtonian law construes uniform-
rectilinear motion , along with rest, as force free states of motion . On the impetus
theoretical approach , impetus effects the continuation of all motion - including uniform-
rectilinear motion . However, by Newtonian lights this latter type of motion has no
cause. The required force does not exist , and in particular , it is by no means to be
identified with momentuni (which is at most an effect of motion but certainly does not
bring it about). It follows that the concept of impetus cannot be imported into classical
mechanics . Finding a conceptual counterpart of"impetus " in Newtonian physics is ruled
out by the incompatibility between the tendency to rest and principle of inertia. As a
result of this substantive contrast , appending the concept of impetus to Newtonian
theory would create an inconsistency : it would amount to stating that the preservation
of all motion ( including uniform-rectilinear motion ) requires the action of some force,
while at the same time denying this claim in virtue of the principle of inertia. Due to this
inconsistency the concept of impetus cannot be translated into its prima facie
Newtonian analog, i.e., momentum. The two concepts are inconunensurable (Feyer-
abend, 1962, pp. 52-62).
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Accordingly, incommensurability is understood as non-translatability of a concept
of one theory into a superficially analogous concept of another theory, whereby the
reason of this translation failure is the inconsistency of the theories involved.
Feyerabend later blurred this view under critical pressure. Dudley Shapere obejcted that
statements lacking shared meaning can neither contradict nor agree with one another.
Feyerabend conceded the point and attempted to characterize incommensurability as
incompatibility without inconsistency, drawing for this purpose an notions like "the
structure of the ontologies" and the "grammatical habits" associated with the pertinent
accounts (Sankey, 1994, pp. 13-15).
However, there is no need to withdraw to such a frail position, being in constant
danger of collapsing into either compatibility or inconsistency. The Bist ofFeyerabend's
original view could be saved by realizing that the inconsistency only arises within the
language of one of the theories involved, but not, strictly speaking; between these
theories. The inconsistency is created by any attempt to import a given concept of one
of the theories into the conceptual framework of the other. The contradiction is
produced by attempted translations. One might object to this construal that if meaning
variance is assumed, even potential conceptual analogs could not be identified so that
the adequacy of potential translations could not be assessed. Consequently, as the
objection might proceed, it is neverjustified to claim that each potential translation has
failed. But this argument is mistaken. As Kuhn is eager to stress, it is possible to
understand a concept without being able to translate it into another language (Kuhn,
1983, pp. 671-673; 1993, pp. 320, 324; see section 10). Actually, it follows from the
context theory that each of the relevant theories can be learned by acquainting oneself
with the pertinent network of conceptual relations. In such cases, understanding comes
from within, as it were, not from anchoring the new content in a framework of
previously accepted beliefs. The conceptual gap between two theories may be clearly
identifiable without at the same time being able to bridge that gap through translation.
In the following, 1 leave Feyerabend's flimsy later views out of consideration and focus
an his more tangible earlier approach.
White Feyerabend confined the application of the term "incommensurability" to
problems of translation all along, Kuhn started with a much wider concept that included
perceptual, methodological, linguistic, and ontological relations. But later, Kuhn
approached Feyerabend's notion in singling out linguistic divergence as the crucial
feature of incommensurability. Non-translatability is shifted to center stage. Character-
istic of the later Kuhn's position in this question is the focus an the relation between
scientific or natural kinds in the theories at issue. A theory is thought to comprise a
"lexicon" which contains the kind-terms employed by the relevant scientific community.
These kind-terms indicate what is taken as being of the same kind; they represent
expected similarity relations among objects or processes. Kuhn recognizes that the
structure of kinds is tied up with the generalizations that are constitutive of the
corresponding account. That is, kind-terms are connected to the laws ofthe concomitant
theory; they represent the relations of similarity or sameness in kind that are implicitly
circumscribed by the relevant laws (Kuhn, 1983, pp. 680-684; 1987, pp. 19-21; 1990,
p. 5; 1993, p. 316; see Carrier, 1994, pp. 7-8).Z
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Kuhn's claim is that the adequacy of translation may be judged in terms of the
preservation of the kind-structure. Translation succeeds if the lexical structure or
taxonomy is retained; conversely, incommensurability arises in cases of divergent
lexical structures. Discrepancy among such taxonomies is the chief obstacle to
translation (Kuhn, 1983, p. 683; 1993, pp. 325-326; see Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, pp.
217-218). Kuhn attempted to make this condition of kind-preservation more precise by
appeal to the "principle of no overlap". The only taxonomic relation that doesn't thwart
translation is dass inclusion: "no two kind-terms ... may overlap in their referents unless
they are related as species to genus." (Kuhn, 1990, p. 4) If cases inclusion obtains the
old categories are imported as intact wholes into the new taxonomy. If, by contrast, the
principle is violated, the overlap among the referents of the affected concepts is only
partial. In such cases, scientific kinds are tom into pieces, and the debris is reassembled
to form novel, disparate kinds. What was formerly considered as being of the same
nature may be regarded as heterogeneous afterward. Conversely, what was thought to
be different in kind may be taken as conceptually unified in the new theory. It follows
that two items which fall under the same category an one account are possibly denoted
using different concepts an the other account. And two items labeled distinctly in one
approach could be addressed uniformly in the other approach. Cross-classification of
this sort vitiates translation; incommensurability is the result (Kuten, 1990, pp. 4-5;
1993, pp. 318-319; see Irzik & Grünberg, 1995, p. 299; 1998, pp. 211-212).'
The Situation can be illustrated using one of Kuhn's own examples. The Copernican
Revolution induced a change in meaning and reference of the concept "planet".
Geocentrically speaking, "planet" means celestial body rotating around the earth. Mars,
Sun and Moon equally qualify as planets in this sense while the Earth does not. Helio-
centrically speaking, "planet" means celestial body revolving around the Sun.
According to this changed understanding, Earth and Mars pass as planets, while neither
Sun nor Moon do. These changes in meaning are intertwined with a shift in the
taxonomy ofthe relevant bodies. Geocentrically, Mars, Sun and Moon form part ofthe
same scientific kind, whereas the Earth was subsumed under a different heading. After
the revolution, Earth and Mars were equal in kind, while Sun and Moon shifted in kind
in becoming a star and a satellite, respectively. The members of the geocentric kind
"planet" were scattered into distinct taxa and placed alongside entities which were
formerly taken to be of heterogeneous nature. The no-overlap principle is violated with
the result that the geocentric concept "planet" proves untranslatable into its alleged
heliocentric counterpart. We are faced with an example of incommensurable concepts
(Kuhn, 1962, pp. 115, 128-129; 1987, p. 8; Sankey, 1997, pp. 434, 442; Irzik &
Grünberg, 1998, p. 211).
Plausible as it may appear at first sight, though, Kuhn's distinction of the
relationship of the relevant kind-structures as the pivot of translatabiltiy is mistaken.
Neither does taxonomic agreement vouch for translatability, nor does taxonomic
divergence rule out translatability. The frst point was successfully argued by Howard
Sankey by laying emphasis an the fact that a taxonomic structure ä la Kuhn is a purely
extensional feature. A taxonomy comprises ordered sets of entities which are presumed
to be of the same kind, while the criteria determining membership in these sets are held
to be variable and intentionally left out of consideration (Kuhn, 1983, p. 683). A
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scientific kind is a class of entities assumed to be alike - regardless of the respect in
which they are thought to agree. However, as Sankey points out, this is not enough for
translation. The general counterexample is co-referring, non-synonymous expressions
(Sankey, 1994, pp. 98-100). Think of the venerable case of featherless bipeds and
rational animals. The corresponding expressions co-refer; they equally denote the class
of all humans. But their linguistic role and argumentative context do not coincide; after
all, plucked chickens are inferentially connected exclusively to the ferst term. Con-
sequently, both expressions differ in meaning and thus fail as translations.'
Second, mere taxonomic differente does not suffice to thwart translation. It has to
be ruled out, in addition, that the taxonomies in question can be amended and adapted
to one another. Taxonomic divergence that is supposed to bear an the notion of
incommensurability has to be a matter of principle. Consider the following fictitious
case of taxonomic discrepancy in botany. Let one language differentiate between trees
and bushes and another one distinguish between deciduous plants and conifers. Each of
these languages is more precise in one respect and less precise in another. As a result,
one encounters a partial overlap among the relevant equivalence classes; e.g., some
conifers are trees and some are bushes. So, the principle of no-overlap is violated and
translation should fail. In fact, one is at a loss to identify a conceptual analog to "tree",
say. "Conifer" is too narrow since there are deciduous trees as well. "Conifer or
deciduous plant" is too broad since this would inciude gorse bushes which are definitely
not trees. However, this notion of untranslatability is far too weak to do justice to the
intuitions linked with incommensurability. For this taxonomic gap is so shallow that it
can be filled without much ado. Nothing prevents us from simply conjoining the two
distinctions, thereby creating a four-fold taxonomy of deciduous trees, coniferic bushes
and so on. As to incommensurable concepts, such simple conjunction should be of no
avail. In this case, mutual adaptation of the taxonomies has to be ruled out by some
contrasting and conflicting beliefs about the relevant realm.
The upshot of both these considerations is that as regards accounting for
incommensurability, laws and theories are prior to scientific kinds. Taxonomy is not
enough; the criteria for collecting individuals in the respective kinds are of crucial
importance as well (Sankey, 1994, pp. 79-81). Concerning incommensurable concepts,
there are reasons for setting up the taxonomy in a particular fashion and for resisting
attempts to remodel and adjust it to some other structure of kinds. There are reasons
underlying discrepant taxonomies which also provide the basis for their sustained
mismatch. This consideration brings the issue of theoretical incompatibility back into
thepicture. Theory and rival explanation is primary, taxonomic divergence is derivative.
Discrepancies of lexical structures that bear an the issue of incommensurability
originate from contrasting views of the domain in question.
Tobe sure, Kuhn clearly recognizes that taxonomy is dependent an theory and that,
consequently, taxonomic discrepancy testifies to an underlying theoretical divergence.
This is conspicuous in Kuhn's comment an the mentioned reshuffling ofthe astronomic
equivalence classes in the course of the Copernican Revolution.
Changes of that sort were not simpty corrections of individual mistakes embedded in the
Ptolemaic system. Like the transition to Newton's laws of motion, they involved not only
changes in the taws of nature but also changes in the criteria by which some terms in Chose
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Iaws are attached to nature. These criteria, furthermore, were in part dependent upon the
theorv with which thev were introduced. (Kuten. 1987, p. 8)
Kuhn's claim is that theories entail criteria for applying concepts within the realm of
phenomena and that these criteria in turn imply structures of scientific kinds. What
Kuhn denies is that changes of such criteria are sufficient for blocking translation
(Kuhn, 1987, p. 19). Referential shifts are essential for translation failure to arise. In the
same vein, Kuhn stresses the importance of reasons underlying a divergence in kind-
structure. A purely conventional discrepancy would not last but rather be defused by
conceptual adaptation. Taxonomic divergence relevant to the incotmmensurability issue
is not simply semantic but involves a disagreement about things. The choice of names
"is no longer about linguistic conventions but rather about matters of evidence and
fact." (Kuhn, 1993, p. 318) That is, Kuhn takes contrasting theoretical assumptions as
underlying relevantly conflicting lexical structures, an the orte hand, but still identifies
incommensurability with taxonomic clash. The preceding arguments were intended to
make plausible that the adequacy of translation cannot be judged exclusively by the
agreement amongkind-structures. Criteria employed for establishing kinds are essential
as well, and this distinguishes theoretical incompatibility as the foundation of
incorrunensurability.
What emerges from these considerations is the following "rational reconstruction"
of the "Kuhn-Feyerabendian" notion of incommensurability. Concepts are incommen-
surable if they fail to be translatable owing to an underlying theoretical contrast. Orte
of the salient obstacles to translation is cross-classification which is tantamount to the
violation ofthe principle of no overlap. But cross-classification leads to incommensur-
ability only an the condition that it is produced by conflicting views and premises. That
is, not each violation of the principle of no overlap engenders incommensurability.
Emergence of the latter demands theoretical incompatibility as an essential element.
4. TRANSLATION IN THE CONTEXT THEORY OF MEANING
On the basis of the just given rational reconstruction , cross -classification ceases to be
the defining feature of incormmensurability. Rather , translation failure becomes a
consequence of conflicting theoretical approaches whose clash may in turn issue in
deviant kind -structures . We are faced with a sort of common cause scenario in which
discrepant principles bring about both untranslatability and cross -classification. lt is
plain, an the other hand , that not each theoretical conflict has such striking effects. In
order to -et a firmer grip an the sort of theoretical incompatibility that underlies
incommensurability , the nature ofthe relevant obstacles to translation need to be studied
in greater detail . So let ' s hark back to the context theory of meaning and ask what
requirements are to be placed an adequate translations within this framework.
Translation in the Sense relevant here concerns the concepts of different theories.
Translation requires the coordination of a linguistic item with another one taken from
a different theoretical framework but possessing the Same meaning. The understanding
underlying the entire discussion of the incommensurability thesis is that translation
needs tobe precise (clumsy paraphrases don't suffice ) and to provide a one -one correla-
tion between expressions . The latter condition does not demand that one word is
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assigned to exactly one word; rather, coordinating strings of words with one another is
quite legitimate. The issue is not about words but about semantic resources. lt is not
about terminology but about what can be said within a conceptual framework (Sankey,
1994, pp. 76-77).
Adequate translation needs to preserve the meaning of the relevant concepts or
statements. The question is how this requirement ofunchanged meaning is tobe spelled
out within the context theory. Orte of the insights popularized by Hilary Putnam's
"Twin-Earth" thought experiment (Putnam, 197 5 , pp. 220-224) is that linguistic
relations alone are insufficient for establishing meaning. At some stage a connection
between linguistic items and extra-linguistic circumstances is unavoidable. Orte of the
most prominent attempts to forge such a link is "Sellars' triad" ofperception, inference,
and action. The linguistic role of an expression is captured by its application to
perceptual states, the associated network of inference rules, and the actions tied to its
utterance (Sellars, 1979, p. 121; Brandom, 1994, pp. 131-134).5
These three features can be condensed into two, one referring to the empirical
application and the other to the theoretical integration of a tenn. Sellars highlights the
conditions ofapplication as detenninants ofthe meaning ofpredicates and explains that
sameness of meaning demands sameness of the rote accorded to the predicate in the
"linguistic economy" of the pertinent cotnnunity (Sellars, 1963, § 31). This can be
elaborated to the effect that two demands are to be fulfilled by translations. First,
theoretical integration should coincide for the two items at issue. This applies, in
particular, to the reproduction of Standing inferential relations among the predicates or
the sentences formed by using these predicates. Such relations provide the context
relevant to the ascription of meaning. For example, the sentence "the tree over there
loses its foliage" implies: "there is a deciduous tree." Analogously, "Wilfried is a
bachelor" entails "Wilfried is not divorced" (see section 2). The network of such
relations supplies predicates with their content; consequently, these relations should be
preserved among supposedly synonymous expressions. Second, the conditions of
application of concepts should remain unaltered. Orte of the reasons why the Genpan
predicate "x hat schwarze Haare" is disqualified as a translation of"x is a bachelor" is
that their conditions of application differ wildly. In fact, these conditions exhibit hardly
any correlation. The two predicates are only accidentally applied to the saure objects;
they differ in meaning for this reason.
Ort the whole, then, the theoretical context account recognizes two chief deter-
minants of the meaning of concepts. First, the inferential integration of a concept which
is specified by its relations to other concepts. The integration of scientific concepts, in
particular, is supplied by the concomitant laws or theories. Second, the conditions of
application are determined by the set ofsituations to which a concept is thought to apply
(or not to apply, respectively).6 To these two sources of meaning correspond two
constraints an adequate translations. Rendering a concept appropriately demands, first,
the preservation of the relevant inferential relations, and second, the retention of the
conditions of application.
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5. SHIFTING THEORETICAL GROUND: THE EXAMPLE OF THE CHEMICAL
REVOLUTION
Let me turn to a concrete case from the history of science and examine if these two
conditions can be satisfied. An often quoted instance of a Kuhnian revolution is the
Chemical Revolution which involved the substitution of the phlogiston theory by the
oxygen theory (Hoyningen-Huene, 1998, pp. 492-496). This is a revolutionary change
by any measure so that the presence of incommensurable linguistic items can safely be
expected - if incommensurability is supposed to be instantiated at all.
The Chemical Revolution roughly extends from 1775 to 1790 and was chiefly
brought about byAntoine de Lavoisier. Pre-revolutionary chemistry primarily addressed
the problem of explaining the properties of chemical substances and the changes of
these properties in chemical reactions. The approach underlying these explanations was
the so-called chemistry of principles. In its framework abstract bearers of properties
were assumed which were supposed to confer their properties an the usual substances
they enter. Changes of properties in reactions were attributed to the transfer of such
principles. Relevant properties are solidity, volatility, or combustibility. Principles cor-
respond to such properties; they are not identical to chemical substances. Rather,
principles are thought to be more fundamental than substances and to provide the basis
for an explanation ofthe features ofthe latter. On the basis ofthis approach it makes no
sense to require that principles be detectable in the laboratory. Such a requirement
would have seriously distorted the deductive structure of the theory. It would have
created a circularity by claiming, in effect, that the properties of chemical substances
are tobe accounted for by the properties ofchemical substances. Further, each principle
is associated with a number ofproperties. It is clear that the attachment of one principle
to each chemical property would have made the theory rather pointless. But in all its
versions, the chemistry of principles introduced but a small number of principles. The
challenge was to trace back the variety of empirically accessible properties to only a few
property bearing principles.
The phlogiston theory is a specific variant of the principles approach and was
developed by Georg Ernst Stahl late in the 17`h century. Stahl's chief objective was to
give a more unified account of combustion processes. His claim was that there is only
one such principle involved in combustion processes from all kingdoms of nature
(whereas a number of related sub-principles had been assumed before). This dis-
tinguished unique principle of combustibility was called "phlogiston" (which derives
from the Greek word for "combustible"). This means that the combustibility ofchemical
substances is caused by the fact that they contain phlogiston. This principle is released
from the burning body during combustion. Fire and flames make it obvious that
something is set free in burning; and the residue, i.e., the ash, has lost the property of
combustibility. Stahl's unified account entailed that the "calcination" er roasting of
metals (their "oxidation" in modern terms) was also produced by phlogiston escape. All
combustion processes and all calcinations are brought about by the saure mechanism of
phlogiston release. Stahl intended to support this claim by inverting the process of
calcination, that is, to produce a metal from its calx, by supplying phlogiston from non-
inetallic substances. For instance, Stahl managed to prepare metallic lead out of lead
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calx (PbO) by means of heating it with glowing charcoal (whose phlogiston is set free
in burning). Charcoal is of organic origin and yet it is suitable for restoring the
phlogiston to the lead calx and for transforming the latter into the metal. The conclusion
was that phlogiston is alike in all the kingdoms ofnature; there is only one principle of
combustibility (Ströker, 1982, pp. 93-94; Carrier, 1993, pp. 401-402).
This sketch illustrates that phlogistic reasoning centered an properties and their
transfer. Lavoisier's oxygen theory, by contrast, represents an essentially modern
approach to chemistry. lt involved, first, the introduction of a different mechanism of
combustion, and second, the abandoning of the entire chemistry of principles (although
residues ofthe principles can still be identified in Lavoisier's thought). Combustion was
no longer interpreted as the release of a property bearing principle but as a combination
with a particular chemical substance, namely oxygen. More generally, the subject matter
of chemistry was restricted to substances that can be isolated in the laboratory. Thus,
the explanatory basis of chemistry changed which went along with a corresponding
alteration of the explanatory objectives. The aim was no longer to account for the
properties of substances. The explanation of chemical reactions was now judged
according to the ability to accommodate the reaction weights which had been almost
completely ignored earlier and were thought rather to belong to physics.
The upshot is that the Chemical Revolution involved the substitution of a theory by
a conceptually disparate one. The assumed entities er the explanatory basis changed
drastically: abstract, property bearing principles were supplanted by ordinary chemical
substances. The supposed mechanism was exchanged: escape of a constituent was
abandoned in favor of compound formation. Finally, the research agenda was
overturned: properties of substances shifted into the Background, whereas reaction
weights entered the realm of chemical problems.
6. THEORETICAL CHANGE, CONCEPTUAL DISPARITY AND
TRANSLATION FAILURE
The issue is whether or in virtue of which mechanism such a drastic theoretical change
might produce a conceptual disparity that could defeat translation . It is clear, to begin
with, that the term "phlogiston " is not part of the oxygen theory; but its lack need not
have detrimental effects an the conceptual comparability of both theories . After all,
"Buch" is not a word of the English language, and yet this omission in no way creates
a conceptual incomparability. lt might still be possible to introduce the concept of
phlogiston , or some analog , into the framework of the oxygen theory. In order to find
out if there are any such options, the two conditions of adequacy developed earlier are
to be invoked. First, the theoretical Integration er the inferential relations among
concepts or predicates need tobe preserved and, second , their conditions of application
should be retained (see section 2). Let' s see how priinafacie translations fare in light
of these conditions.
The first try is to translate "phlogiston" by drawing an its opposite functional role
as compared to oxygen . This amounts to rendering "phlogiston escape " as "oxygen
bonding". This Suggestion is buttressed by the fact that in most cases in which partisans
ofthe phlogiston theory thought it legitimate to apply the predicate "phlogiston escape",
adherents of the oxygen theory would speak of "oxygen bonding". It follows that the
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conditions of application for both terms roughly coincide. However, the drawback is
that the inferential relations fall to be preserved. A case in point is that the presence of
phlogiston is connected with the color and the nature of the pertinent substance. For
instance, a substance containing a large amount of phlogiston is assumed to be of an
"oily-fatty nature". Consequently, combustibility and oily-fatty nature are both taken as
empirical indicators of the Same theoretical state, namely, a high proportion of
phlogiston. This correlation provides a basis for inferences ofthe following kind: resin
is combustible because it is of oily nature. But nothing of this sort follows from the
oxygen theory if "high proportion of phlogiston" is replaced by "capacity to combine
with large amounts of oxygen", as it would have to an the above translation rule.' The
phlogiston theory specifies relations among properties which are not part ofthe oxygen
theory. Oxides aren't distinguished by their joint characteristics. In fact, matters are
even worse. Since the oxygen theory fails to address substance properties, correlations
of this sort cannot be added to the theory either. The oxygen theory does not simply
happen to rernain silent an substance properties. Rather, abandoning the principles
approach is tantamount to waiving explanations an the basis of property correlations.$
Thus, such correlations are conceptually allen to oxygen theory; appending them to the
theory would create a serious incoherence. It follows that the acceptance of a translation
rule ofthis sort preserves the conditions of application, to be sure, but falls to reproduce
the relevant inferential relations. It falls short of underwriting adequate translations for
this reason.
The second try involves the attempt to preserve these inferential relations. The
pursuit ofthis line amounts to explicating "phlogiston" the way 1 did earlier in sketching
the content of the phlogiston theory (see section 5). One could roughly say that
phlogiston is conceived as a non-material bearer of properties whose presence generates
the combustibility and oily-fatty nature of the relevant substance. However, this
translation rule entails a significant alteration of the conditions of application of the
concept. In fact, proceeding along these lines involves the loss of all such conditions.
There is no such thing as phlogiston by the oxygen theory's lights. If the phlogistic
concept is simply grafted onto the oxygen theory, the concept becomes empty; it is no
Ion-er legitimately applied to any phenomenon. The attempt to retain the inferential
relations is pursued at the expense of losing the conditions of application. It does not
provide an appropriate translation for this reason.
The upshot is that the translation of concepts from disparate theories leaves one with
the stark choice between two equally unacceptable alternatives. The first one is to
translate according to the relevant conditions of application. That is, the two predicates
are applied to the Same observable circumstances. The catch is that the predicates (or
the claims expressed with their help) do not exhibit the Same inferential relations.
Adherents of the oxygen theory refuse to accept that substance properties are connected
by the causal influence of a non-material constituent. The second Option is to translate
in such a way that the inferential relations are retained. This amounts to giving a general
description of the idea of property bearing entities and their transfer in chemical
reactions. But the concept specified in this fashion is empty so that the conditions of
application are not preserved. It deserves emphasis that the absence of an appropriate
counterpart to the concept of phlogiston is in no way a simple gap within the oxygen
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theory. This concept cannot be introduced into the framework of the lauer theory.
Dropping the principles is tantamount to abandoning property bearing entities;
appending the latter to the theory as an afterthought creates an incoherence. This means
that there is no way of retaining the conditions of application while at the same time
remaining faithful to the idea of phlogiston and the inferential relations tied to it. By
pursuing this second Option one is bound to lose all instances of legitimate application.
There is no route to an adequate translation of"phlogiston" or related concepts into the
terms of the oxygen theory. This is why "phlogiston" is incommensurable with the
concepts of the latter theory.9
Let's have a quick glance at the other two examples of incommensurable concepts
mentioned so as to explore if this conclusion can be generalized. The first example
concerns "impetus" and "momentum" (see section 3). Judged by the requirement to
retain the conditions of application, "impetus" and "momentum" are conceptual analogs.
Both quantities are estimated by the product of a body's velocity and its weight or mass.
However, this rendering did violence to the disparate inferential roles of the two
expressions in their respective theories. Impetus acts as a cause ofmotion ofthe relevant
body while momentum doesn't. Drawing instead an the theoretical context, one might
explicate "impetus" as the impressed force that contributes to maintaining motion.
However, classical mechanics fails to recognize such a force. The concept rendered in
this fashion becomes vacuous.
A similar line of argument applies to the relation between the concepts "geocentric
planet" and "heliocentric planet". Term coordination via conditions of application can
be achieved by listing the relevant objects. Geocentric planets comprehend Moon,
Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. Viewed from the heliocentric perspective,
the theoretical context of these entities is heterogeneous. We are dealing with
heliocentric planets, stars, and satellites, each ofwhich is accorded a distinct theoretical
status. Conversely, trying to preserve the inferential role by invoking the defining
feature of geocentric planets, namely, revolution around the Earth, leaves one with the
Moon which fails to qualify as heliocentric planet in the ferst place. So, the conditions
of application come out garbled.
These examples suggest that the type of conflict emerging here is a general feature
of incommensurability.10 The translation failure of incommensurable concepts arises
from the impossibility to jointly fulfill the two conditions of adequacy that the context
theory places an translations. Would be conceptual analogs either fall to maintain the
conditions of application or to reproduce the concomitant inferential relations. This is
how theoretical incompatibility brings about translation failure.
7. INCOMMENSURABILITY RESULTING FROM A CLASH
BETWEEN WORLDVIEWS
Incommensurability is not confined to scientific concepts - as Feyerabend was eager to
stress (see, e.g., Feyerabend, 1972, pp. 304-306). Rather, metaphysical positions or
worldviews are analogous to scientific theories in the relevant conceptual respect. The
alteration of such comprehensive approaches in the course of history also creates
incommensurability. The concept of a witch is a case in point. As a result of cultural
change, this concept is untranslatable into any concept taken from the contemporary,
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science based conception. In early modern times, the concept of witch was used to
denote roughly the following conjunction of properties. A witch was supposed to be a
woman ofugly appearance with unusual and inexplicable capabilities (such as healing
or predicting the future) and strange behavior (eccentric or insane appearance). She
owes these traits to a pact with the devil in which she traded her salvation for the
capacity of performing feats suitable to impress ignorant and untutored people. She
enjoys broom riding and lascivious dancing in order to please the Malefactor.
No concept of present-day, science based language is apt to capture this collection
of properties. To be sure, one may explicate the concept in contemporary terms and
elucidate in this way the inferential context and the pertinent semantic field (which Ijust
tried to do). But this procedure would make the concept empty; it is no longer rightly
applied under any circumstances. Each statement containing an ascription ofthe concept
to a person is considered wrong. To our dismay, this was different in the early modern
period. Consequently, this explication fails to reproduce the conditions of application
and is disqualified as a translation for this reason.
Conversely, one might restrict the rendering of the term "witch" to the observable
indications traditionally associated with it. Witches were empirically identified by their
unexpected capacities and their strange behavior, and one could use these criteria as
clues for a translation into the language of present-day views. Proceeding in this way
and dropping, consequently, any reference to the interference of the evil spirit manages
to preserve the concept's conditions of application. Orte might use the term "pseudo-
witch" to denote persons exhibiting traits that would have made them appear to be
witches in those dark ages. Consequently, the truth value of statements like the
following can be retained: "Witches are miraculously successful in healing diseases."
One only has to replace "witch" with its modern empirical equivalent, the "pseudo-
witch".
However, the conceptual Integration of this ersatz concept differs wildly from that
of its alleged counterpart. While statements about witches possess metaphysical Import,
sentences referring to pseudo-witches are related to religious mania, psychopathological
disorder, and placebo effects. The conceptual tie to salvation is severed, and a
connection to hysterical reactions is forged instead. Theology as the relevant discipline
is replaced by psychology, or psychopathology for that matter. The theoretical context
of the original concept and its assumed modern day counterpart are completely
disparate. This is why this procedure falls as a translation as well.
Again, the attempt to retain the conditions of application overturns the inferential
relations of the concept; and the preservation of these relations entails the alteration, or
the outright loss, of the conditions of application of this concept. Neither procedure
leads to adequate translation. 1 conclude that incommensurability has a wider impact
and is not restricted to scientific concepts in the narrow sense.
8. NON-TRANSLATABILITY, CROSS-CLASSIFICATION
AND REFERENCE SHIFTS
Let me quickly recapitulate the conceptual situation. 1 argued earlier that it is
inappropriate to accord scientific kinds the principal role in the emergence of
incommensurability. Rather, it is the incompatibility of theoretical premises that
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generates incommensurability in the first place (see section 3). In the framework of the
context theory, theoretical alterations induce meaning changes. If the discrepancy
between two concepts taken from different theories is such that either the inferential
relations or the conditions of application can be preserved, whereas their joint
satisfaction cannot be accomplished, these two concepts are incommensurable. 1
mentioned before that this account of incommensurable concepts removes scientific
kinds from the central position Kuhn assigns to them (see section 4). Still, kinds remain
definitely part of the picture. 1 argued that Kuhn connects kinds with laws and theories.
Laws contribute to establishing what is equal in kind. A scientific kind is a class of
objects or processes which are governed by the same laws or theories (see section 3).
Consequently, the account developed here suggests a correlation between these two
features. Incommensurability is expected to result from both the particular sort of
translation failure 1 tried to expound and the cross-classification of scientific kinds that
Kuhn took to be pivotal. Allow me to make a quick inspection as to whether the
discussed instances oftranslation failure also exhibit the Kuhnian realignment of kinds,
i.e., the dissection of kinds and the formation of new ones in their place (see section 3).
The adoption of the Oxygen theory was indeed accompanied by a considerable shift
in the taxonomy of kinds. The first relevant relation is the splitting up of kinds: what
was formerly considered as being of the Same nature is regarded as different afterward.
In the phlogiston theory, but not in the oxygen theory, combustibility is conceptually
tied to other tangible features of the relevant body (such as color and oily-fatty
constitution). Phlogiston is taken as the common cause underlying such correlations. In
the oxygen theory, or rather its present day successor, combustibility involves the
capacity to combine with oxygen whereas a body's oily-fatty nature has to do with the
presence of a large proportion of electronic double bonds. That is, what was conceptu-
ally united before the revolution crumbled into separate pieces afterward.
Conversely, the oxygen theory removed the chief conceptual division of the entire
principles approach; the distinction, namely, between ordinary substances and non-
material property bearers. Chemistry is confined to substances that are identifiable in
the laboratory. This move involved a major conceptual unification which essentially
supplied chemistry with the outline of its modern ontology. The impact of this
unification extended well into the realm of chemical phenomena. It entailed a coherent
treatment of distinctions among substances that were thought to go back to the presence
of different principles, for one, and other differences that were attributed to the variety
of material bares to which the principles were asssumed to combine, for another.
The impetus-momentum example likewise exhibits the Kuhnian cross-classification
of kinds. The relevant dividing line runs between forced motion and force free motion.
Impetus physics singles out rest as the only force free state; all motion is forced.''
Classical mechanics collects rest together with uniform rectilinear motion into the
unified dass of inertial motion and contrasts it with accelerated motion and rotation.
Consequently, this newly formed scientific kind of inertial motion cross-classifies the
previous distinction between rest and forced motion. Frictionless and otherwise
unimpeded uniform rectilinear motion does not fit either one of the older categories.
Such motion is connected to resting carriages and separated from flying arrows and
spinning tops.
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The realignment of equivalence classes can similarly be identified in the conceptual
changes produced by cultural development. The loss of the concept of a witch is
accompanied by the division of a set of properties that were formerlyjointly indicative
of the state in question. Miraculous healing was connected then, but not now, with
riding brooms and enjoying diabolic company. Conversely, the concept of the pseudo-
witch forges novel links of there Same empirical indications to contexts like religious
mania and psychopathological disorder.
Since the taxonomic conflict going along with the conceptual shift of the notion of
planet was explained earlier (see section 3), this quick survey tentatively confirms the
earlier expectation: whenever two theories clash such that the rendering of a concept
from one theory in the tenns of the other preserves either the empirical features er the
theoretical integration, but not both, this concept and their would be analogs denote
scientific kinds that cross-classify each other. In such cases the underlying theoretical
conflict jointly bottoms out as untranslatability and as cross-classification of the
nomologically established equivalence classes.
This consideration suggests that incommensurability is tied up with reference shifts.
One of the reasons for translation failure to occur is the inability to preserve the
conditions of application - which involves a reference shift. Moreover, partial overlap
of taxonomic classes is likewise tantamount to a change in denotation. The relevant
realm of phenomena is carved up in a divergent fashion. Incommensurable concepts do
not just mean different things, they also refer to different things. Actually, a linkage
between meaning variance and reference shift is to be expected in the context theory of
meaning independent of there more specific considerations of translation failure and
taxonomic divergence. For the context theory involves a descriptive account of
reference detennination according to which properties serve to-§ingle out the scope of
a concept. The attribute of being a rational animal fixes the corresponding dass of
denoted objects; humankind emerges as the set of entities satisfying this description. If
the assigned property is altered to, say, rational machines, the pertinent set of referents
changes as well and now includes some, but by no means all, computers. It is true, it
may happen that concepts with different meaning pick out the saure referents (as
"rational animals" and "featherless bipeds") (see section 3). But in the large majority
of cases such concepts refer to distinct objects er processes. Consequently,
incommensurable concepts are likely to differ in reference.
lt is only due to this wider impact that incommensurability could be viewed as a
threat to scientific rationality. On the face of it, there is no reason to be worried about
untranslatability. On the contrary, it appears quite plausible that the concepts of
mistaken theories cannot be rendered in the framework of their more correct successors.
These ill-conceived concepts are dropped as the pertinent theories are superseded by
improved approaches. The occurrence of a translation failure of the kind in question
indicates that science progresses profoundly. For instance, it was realized by oxygen
theorists that there is no such thing as phlogiston. Therefore, it is only natural that a
concept which was discovered tobe misleading and empty cannot be integrated into the
superior theory. However, if theory change goes along with reference change, the
successor theory says different things about different objects - rather than different
things about the Same objects. This militates against a cumulative view of scientific
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progress. Progress cannot be regarded as being tantamount to understanding more and
more aspects of the Same entities.
It is true, alternative approaches in the philosophy of language sever this tie between
meaning and reference. The causal theory of reference accommodates reference by
drawing an conceptions such as "original name-giving ceremony" or "initial baptism".
In virtue of the independence of these mechanisms from the meaning of the concepts
introduced in this fashion, referential stability may obtain in spite of meaning change.
However, establishing the mere possibility of invariant denotation is not enough.
Feyerabend and Kuhn stressed that reference shifts are actually to be found in cases of
incommensurability. Denotational changes are not merely derived from linguistic
principles such that they could be discarded by switching the principles; such changes
can rather be demonstrated in the historical record (Sankey, 1994, p. 44; Sankey, 1997,
p. 429). The Same lesson accrues from the discussed examples. The reference of
"phlogiston" definitely fails to be preserved in the Chemical Revolution, and the
transition to heliocentric theory doubtlessly entails a profound alteration in the domain
of application of the term "planet". There is nothing to be gained here with referential
stability. The cumulative character of science cannot be captured by assuming a
sustained invariance of meaning and reference of theoretical concepts.
1 refrain from discussing the options of accommodating the problems posed by
incommensurability within an amended causal account.12 There are two reasons why the
treatment of the issue within the context theory recommends itself First, historically
speaking, the incommensurability problem underlay Putnam's adoption of the causal
theory. Putnam argued that this theory was apt to defuse the threat that meaning
variance posed to the rationality of scientific change (Putnam, 1973, pp. 196-202). It
deserves to be examined more closely, then, whether scientific rationality is really
endangered by a context theoretical account er whether the issue can satisfactorily be
treated within the account that gave rise to it. Second, systematically speaking, it
transpires from the discussion of the causal theory in the literature that the pure causal
approach is unsuitable for accommodating ontological change and that it has to be
supplemented with descriptive elements. In this "causal-descriptive" theory, "post-
baptismal use" is granted a role in reference determination (Sankey, 1994, p. 57; 1997,
p. 431). This move amounts to combining elements from the context theory and the pure
causal theory. However, ifthe context theory alone proved sufficient for coping with the
rationality of scientific change, the treatment would be more coherent and unified than
the one afforded by hybrid, two-pronged causal-descriptivisni. So 1 take the context
theory to be the first choice in this matter. Let's see if rationality can be saved within
its framework.
9. EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF THEORIES WITH
INCOMMENSURABLE CONCEPTS
A more thorough look at the situation reveals that two issues are advanced as a threat
to scientific rationality. The first concerns the cumulative view ofthe history of science,
the second bears an the comparability of the empirical achievements of rivaling
theories. The ferst is to be granted outright. 1 take it that incommensurability crucially
undermines the tenet that the history of science is cumulative throughout. Reference
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shifts do occur; the attempt to save the traditional conception of progress as unabated
pile up of truths is a lost cause. ° So let me turn to empirical comparabilitv without
further ado.
The strand of reasoning leading from translation failure to the exclusion ofempirical
comparison roughly looks as follows. Non-translatability implies that the claims ofone
theory cannot be expressed within the framework of the other and vice versa. lt follows
that the content of one theory cannot be captured by the other. But if it remains opaque
what the allegedly rival theory says, there is no way to judge if it agrees er contrasts
with one's own theoretical assumptions. Actually, it is not even clear whether the
theories at hand are competing with one another. A competition requires some realm of
shared reference: competing theories entail deviant predictions about the Same objects.
But in the case of incommensurable theories, as the argument runs, shared reference can
never be ascertained. After all, the supposedly alternative theory is said to be in-
comprehensible. Consequently, no empirical comparison between the claims at issue
seems feasible. On this Interpretation, incommensurability would not just thwart the
intertranslation of the cognitive content of the theories at hand but also vitiate their
comparative empirical evaluation.
Note that this argument in no way rules out empirical examinations of a theory. It
would still be quite possible to detect that a theory contradicted empirical findings
couched in the terms of this same theory. Feyerabend admits that the presence of
incommensurability does not interfere with the Option of undermining a theory using
data interpreted in its own conceptual framework (Feyerabend, 1970, p. 226; 1975, p.
282).
Thus, the hard problem is not empirical test but empirical comparison. The
challenge is to reconstruct the possibility that the saure piece of evidenceunderwrites
one theory and undermines another one incommensurable with the ferst. Feyerabend
tends to deny this possibility and moves toward the following position - without,
however, fully embracing it eventually (Feyerabend, 1970, pp. 220-222, 226; see the
more poignant German formulation Feyerabend, 1978, pp. 184-185, 190; 1975, pp.
282-283). Faced with two incommensurable concepts, the relevant data need to be
described differently in either theory. But in view of the inconimensurability of the
concepts employed it appears illicit to maintain that both descriptions refer to the Same
state of affairs and to suggest that it is the Same piece of evidence that, say, was in
accordance with one ofthe relevant theories and militated against with the rival one. To
be sure, one may point to the relevant apparatus or setup and say that the findings
emerging from "this" device had the effect mentioned. But pointing to an apparatus falls
short of characterizing an experiment er observation. The reason is that experiments or
observations are rypes of activity; otherwise it would make no sense to speak of a
repetition of the saure experiment. This implies that experiments er observations need
tobe identified through a descriptive characterization. But if incommensurable concepts
are involved no ecumenical, theory-neutral description is feasible. There is no way to
coherently construe the claim that the two incommensurable descriptions refer to the
saure experiment or observation. The conclusion of the argument is that theories
couched in incommensurable concepts cannot be compared empirically.
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Kuhn accepts the empirical comparability of such theories an the ground that
incommensurability is always restricted tojust a few concepts. The large majority ofthe
concepts involved have equal meaning and thus provide shared Irzikconceptual
nbasis(Kulm, 1983, pp. 670-671; Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, pp. 2 18-222 ; Grü erg,
1998, p 212). This means that large chunks of the content of the theories affected by
incommensurability can be intertranslated homophonically, and empirical comparability
is secured for these parts. This suggests that translation is supposed to fail and that
empirical comparison is thought to be ruled out for the incommensurable parts of
theories. Consequently, if incommensurability extended to the entirety of the relevant
concepts no empirical comparison should be feasible. Kuhn's position entails that
19ocal" incommensurability does no serious harm to the comparative empirical
evaluation while comprehensive or "global" incommmensurability is vicious.
But in fact, empirical comparability is not ruled out for the incommensurable parts
of theories. The point is that incommensurable theories need to be comparable in some
respect in order to generate a non-trivial translation problem in the first place. A host
of theories is not translatable into one another without anything significant coming out
of it. Darwin's theory of natural selection is not translatable into hydrodynamics;
quantum mechanics cannot be rendered in the concepts of Zen. In order for non-
translatability to become a significant issue at all, such cases need to be excluded. The
obvious way to do this is to draw an one of the defining features of incommensurability,
namely, inconsistency of the laws involved. incommensurable concepts are not
translatable since the relevant laws, as specified within each ofthe theories at hand, are
incompatible with one another (see section 3). In this vein, Feyerabend distinguishes
between competing and independent theories and restricts incommensurability to
concepts from theories of the former kind (Feyerabend, 1972, p. 304). But no such
inconsistency occurs in one of the just mentioned exampies.
The Same result emerges if the earlier analysis of the reasons underlying untranslat-
ability is taken into account. The translation failure of incommensurable concepts is of
a particular sort. Each potential conceptual analog of a given concept either respects the
empirical constraints or the theoretical Integration (see sections 6 and 8). In the earlier
discussion 1 laid stress an the fact that these would be analogs failed to satisfy both
demands and were unsuitable as adequate translations for this reason. But at this
juncture the converse aspect deserves emphasis: incommensurable concepts exhibit a
particular type of relationship to one another. Advocates of incommensurability are
committed to acknowledging some such relationship. lfthere was none, untranslatability
would be a mere triviality.
Consequently, the significance of incommensurability requires that there is some
range of phenomena that the theoriesjointly address (Hoyningen-Huene, 1993, p. 219).
The point is that this common ground is sufficient for enabling one to compare some of
the empirical consequences of the theories involved. Consider a particular experiment
for which both theories claim responsibility. Each of them captures the outcome by
using its own observational vocabulary. For instance, one employs the term "phlogiston
release" and the other one "combination with oxygen" to describe what was happening.
Since there is incommensurability involved, the two concepts cannot be translated into
one another.
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Here is an example. According to the phlogiston theory, metalic calces are like ash
in that their principle of combustibility had escaped (see section 5). In order to
transfonn a calx into the corresponding metal some phlogiston source is needed.
However, the so-called red calx of mercury (HgO) has the remarkable distinction of
being reconvertible into mercury by means of intense heat alone and without anv
identifiable phlogiston supply. The oxygen theory is compatible with this finding while
it constitutes a blatant anomaly of the phlogiston account.
There is worse to come for the phlogiston theorist. Lavoisier collected the gas
released during the reduction of red calx. This gas is oxygen by Lavoisier's lights and
it should be suitable for retransforming metallic mercury into red calx. This can be
achieved, indeed, by using mild heat. The gas collected in the reduction process is
consumed completely during this calcination, suggesting that the reduction of the calx
is in fact the reversal of its production. Moreover, the substance generated in this
experiment is indistinguishable from the red calx obtained by employing oxygen from
a different source. Lavoisier's conclusion was that oxygen was set free from the calx
during the initial reduction process and that this oxygen was suitable, and sufficient, for
reconverting the metal into the calx. On the phlogistic account, by contrast, something
should be taken up, rather than given off, during reduction, and something should be
released, rather than consumed, during calcination. lt is true, phlogiston theorists came
up with auxiliary hypotheses to rescue the theory from this counterexample. But the
point is that both parties took responsibility for accounting for the chemical reaction at
hand. No adherent of the rivaling approaches hesitated to accept the phenomenon as
being of relevance. The phenomenon is that mercury becomes red and brittle in mild
heat and that the metallic luster reappears in intense heat. There was no quarrel among
the factions about this fact. This undisputed fact was in agreement with the-6xygen
theory whereas it contradicted the phlogiston theory.
Consequently, one theory was successful an the very turf where the other was
defeated. And at least one such range of common relevance has to exist so as to create
non-trivial incommensurability in the first place. Consequently, all pairs of incommen-
surable theories necessarily possess at least one realm of phenomena which theyjointly
address and which provides the basis for their empirical comparison (see Papineau,
1979, pp. 137-138; see also Laudan, 1977, pp. 142-144).
10. EMPIRICAL COMPARABILITY, THEORY-LADENNESS
AND TOKEN-TYPING
One of the characteristics of this procedure for comparing incommensurable theories
empirically is that the success or failure of the examination is judged against the
background of one's own commitments and standards. No need for translation arises.
The reasoning from translation failure to empirical non-comparability proceeds by
arguing that claims made using inexpressible concepts cannot be understood and,
consequently, cannot be put to empirical scrutiny (see section 9). But it is in no way
mandatory to have the empirical claims of one theory checked by the adherents of
another theory. A theory may well be tested by its own followers, and to them the
relevant claims are by no means obscure. The only thing necessary to proceed from
empirical test to empirical comparison is a shared realm of phenomena. Advocates of
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each theory have to acknowledge responsibility for coping with these phenomena
(which may be disparately understood in either theory). This much of a common ground
is secured by the mere fact that we are dealing with incommensurable theories.
It might be objected that this procedure abandons one ofthe chief distinctions of the
scientific method, namely, public or inter-subjective control of all the claims enter-
tained. For the sketched approach to empirical comparison appears to restrict access to
the claims at issue to the supporters of the corresponding theory - which would be a
definitely unwholesome feature. However, Kuhn rightly distinguishes between
translation and language acquisition (Kuhn, 1970, section 6; 1983, pp. 676-677; 1990,
pp. 4-5; see section 3). lt is entirely possible to learn a new theoretical language by
studying the theory. lt follows from the context account that concepts can be learned by
familiarizing oneself with the pertinent theoretical context. One may become bilingual
- and yet be at a loss to translate. Translation proceeds by adequately tying together
concepts from different languages, and this is more demanding than being able to locate
concepts within the network of the pertinent language. lt follows that the empirical
comparison of theories with incommensurable concepts can be performed by a single
person. Although such concepts are confined to a single theory, bilingual speakers
manage to switch back and forth between two of them. Polyglot scientists are in a
position directly to compare empirically claims cast in incommensurable concepts.
The upshot is that empirical comparison does not demand a translation of the
relevant theoretical principles into one another. The standards for appropriate
translations are harder to satisfy than the requirements for empirical comparison.
Empirical comparison demands that instantiations of observational consequences can
be correlated, whereas translation requires the mapping of theoretical concepts under
the joint preservation of their inferential relations and their conditions of application
(see section 4). Empirical comparison needs the identification of an experiment or
phenomenon as lying within the domains of application of both theories involved. Such
an identification does not require an agreement an the concepts appropriate for
capturing the observations at hand. Rather, joint identification is possible an the basis
of the description of the equipment employed or of the circumstances under which the
relevant effect is supposed to show up. And nothing beyond joint identification is
needed for this purpose.
Consequently, no theoretically disinfected level of data description is required. The
identification of relevant phenomena may use all theories shared by the two incommen-
surable approaches. This common Pool of observation theories may vary in comparing
different such approaches. Nothing like an observation basis for all theories is requisite;
rather, what is accepted as observation basis may be different for each pair of theories.
This shows that theory-laden evidence may well be brought to bear an the empirical
comparison of incommensurable theories. This sketch provides some idea of how one
might arrive at identifying phenomena that are Laken as relevant by both approaches in
question. Partial agreement an auxiliary theories is the mechanism that allows scientists
to reach agreement an the relevance ofphenomena across the abyss of incommensurable
concepts. Whereas the general argument given in section 9 amounts to a sort of
existente proof of some such shared domain, the more detailed consideration of shared
observation theories circumscribes means by which this domain can be identified.
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For this reason, empirical co nparison need not be impaired by the shift in reference
and the cross-classification that is characteristic of incommensurable concepts. It is not
detrimental to an empirical comparison of the relevant theories that the phlogiston
theory assumes abstract property bearers which are non-existent by the oxygen theory's
lights; nor is this endeavor distorted by the fact that the phlogiston theory alleger
connections among properties that are dissected by the oxygen theory and vice versa
(see section 8). Empirical comparison demands a correlation among observational
tokens; translation needs a connection among tbeoretical types. The former correlation
is necessarily realized for pairs of incommensurable theories. If it were missing the
theories at hand weren't incommensurable. Only if some common ground exists
between theories can any conflict or inconsistency arise between their laws. Theories
addressing completely disjoint sets ofphenomena are compatible with one another and
hence cannot be incommensurable. It is precisely the amount of shared features which
makes translation failure non-trivial in the first place that secures the possibility of
empirical comparison.
lt is at this juncture that the sketched argument against the identification of pieces
of evidente loses its force. Feyerabend intimates that this identification requires shared
recourse to types of experiment er observation and advances apprehensions as to this
assumption (see sec 9). But the token typing may well proceed differently in either
theory. Two experiment tokens may be taken to belong to the Same type in one theory
and to different types in the other. Of course, completely singular events are out of the
question. Rather, the relevant level of token-typing includes observational circum-
stances that are recognized within both approaches. The point is that the incommensur-
able concepts themselves need not be employed for the purpose of identifying the
relevant phenomena.
It is true, joint identification of such phenomena is requisite and demands in turn
some shared concepts. One might object, then, that two theories which exhibited
entirely incon-unensurable conceptual frameworks were incomparable empirically. Bot
such a scenario is incoherent. Without any phenomenon acknowiedged as lying within
the scope of both theories, we are not dealing with inconmensurability at all, but rather
with a trivial case of non-translatability. "Global incommensurability" which allegedly
affects the entirety of relevant concepts is ruled out for conceptual reasons.
Incommensurability cannot be truly comprehensive. Some concepts have to be shared
in order to make the issue arise in the First place.
Tobe sure, the range of empirical overlap between inconunensurable theories might
be narrow and insufficient for an unambiguous comparative evaluation. But problems
of that sort may arise for any pair of theories. There is no guarantee that in comparing
two theories one clearly comes out first. Bot uncertainties of this kind haunt empirical
comparison in general and have nothing specifically to do with incommensurability. The
upshot is thattheories containing incommensurable concepts can be evaluated as to their
comparative empirical achievements - albeit subject to those constraints that restrict
empirical comparison in general.
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11. CONCLUSION
There are three conclusions tobe drawn from these considerations . First, incommensur-
ability is real. The notion can coherently be reconstructed and positive instances of
theories with incommensurable concepts can be specified . Second, incommensurability
does not pose a serious threat to the objectivity of science or its commitment to
experience. Incommensurability is no obstacle to empirical examination and it requires
some option of empirical comparison . Still, it is of lasting importance as a problem in
the philosophy of language. Incommensurability is the translation problem associated
with the context account of meaning. It constitutes the successor problem to Quine's
indeterminacy of translation . Whereas Quine's claim was based an the verification
theory ofineaning , Kuhn ' s and Feyerabend ' s views emerge within the context account.
And whereas Quine is prepared to accept a large number of distinct but equally appro-
priate translations , Kuhn and Feyerabend suggest that there may not be a single
adequate rendering . Thus, the basis and substance of the two positions are fairly
disparate . Incommensurability is the follow up paradox of translation which continues
to haunt us after the demise of verificationism.
Third, in one respect incommensurability continues tobe of epistemic significance.
lt contributes to undermining a cumulative view of scientific progress according to
which science manages incessantly to pile up truths upon one another . The lesson
incommensurability teaches is that losses occur as well . In the course of theory change,
some scientific achievements are conceptually reframed beyond recognition. In
particular , the occurrence of reference shifts poses a serious tlueat to the claim that
scientific theories accomplish an ever deeper understanding of the saure objects and
processes. Actually, one of the targets Kuhn and Feyerabend had aimed at by
introducing the argument from incommensurability was the overthrow ofthe cumulative
view of scientific progress .' s In this respect the inconunensurability thesis retains some
force after all.
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NOTES
This argumentative strategy allows me to leave other linguistic approaches out of consideration (although
1 briefly Couch upon the causal theory of reference. see section 8). My claim is that possible problematic side
effects of incommensurability can be defused an the basis of the very account that gave rise to the relevant
worries. As far as incommensurability is concerned, there is no need to advance alternative linguistic
accounts.
Kahn agrees wich Jerry Fodor in basing kinds an lawful generalizations; kinds are established by laws
(Fodor, 1974, pp. 101-102). A law entails Ihat its instantiations are similar in certain respects so that its
adoption involves a conceptual structuring of the pertinent realm of phenomena. in particular, it involves
assumptions as to what is alike and what is not. For example, it's a law that all protons possess Ilse negative
value of the electron charge and a half-integer spin. Consequently, all protons are of the saure kind in that
they equally display these properties.
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In fact, Feyerabend roughly anticipated aspects of this Kuhnian approach. Feyerabend claimed that
ncommensurability obtains "if a new theory entails that all concepts of the preceding theory have zero
extension er if it introduces rules ... which change the System ofclasses itself" (Feyerabend, 1965, p 98)
Note that the context theoryis sufficient for coping with the relevant meaning differences so that there is
no need to resort to some other sentantic account so as to elucidate meaning. In particular, meaning
ascription should not be based an possible world semantics - as the present author incoherently did in
Carrier, 2000, section 2.
This "broad" conception defended by Brandom does not invoke "wide content" in the sense of Putnam's
thought experiment. Wide content includes reference, whereas the inferential role conceived "broadly" only
comprises empirically accessible states such as perceptions and actions.
' Hoyningen-Huene gives precisely these two features (namely the relations between concepts and their
conditions of application) as the key elements of Kuhn's notion of the meaning of empirical concepts
(Hoyningen-Huene, 1997, pp. 234-235).
If "phlogiston escape" is assumed to be equivalent to "oxygen bonding", the capacity to release large
amounts ofphlogiston is tantamount to the capability of combining with )arge quantities of Oxygen.
Admittedly,thisinvolvesapinchofrationalreconstruction Lavoisierhimselfretainedtracesofprinciples
reasoning. Oxygen, for instance, was assunied to confer the property of acidity an its compounds. One offen
finds that the founder of a theory is less coherent er stringent in his or her argumentation as orte might wich.
Consequently, what is later to become the Standard formulation of a theory frequently goes back to the
disciples rather than to the master himself. Newton's mechanical writings display an ongoing flirtation with
concepts from the Impetus theory, and Darwin adopts large chunks of Lamarckian reasoning.
The alternatives presented in no way exhaust the range of possible translations Another alternative for
coordinating phlogistic terms with concepts from the oxygen theory was suggested by Kitcher and involves
a context specific connection ofthese concepts. Drawing an another version ofthe phlogiston theory, Kitcher
claims that °phlogiston" refers to hydrogen under certain circumstances and refers to nothing under others
(Kitcher, 1978, pp. 530-532, 539-540). Bot splitting up the relevant contexts entails that the inferential
relations are not preserved (as Kuhn was not slow to point out; Kuhn, 1983, pp. 674-678). And the occa-
sional loss ofreference shows that the conditions ofapplicability are not preserved either.
10 There are more examples ofthe kind. "Length", "velocity", arid "mass" in classical electrodynamics and
special relativity are Incommensurable in the Same sense. See Carrier, 2001, section 4.
" This marks the chiefconceptual discrepancy between impetus theoryand Aristotelean physics. The latter
features "natura) motion' as an additional type of motion. Natura) motion continues without external er
internal force and is rather maintained by the body's striving toward the place appropriate to its nature. At
its natural place the body comes to rest. Impetus theory abandons the concept ofnatural place. Put conversely
(as Kepler did), each place is considered a natural place.
'= See, however, Sankey, 1994, chapter 2, for the defense of an interesting approach to this effect.
It may be gleaned front the discussion above that causal descriptivism also grants reference changes (see
section 8). There is no quarrel between teoretical contextualism and causal descriptivism regarding this
issue.
" Feyerabend, 1970, p. 219; Kuhn, 1993, p. 330. Kuhn's anti-cumulative approach is restricted to
revolutionary periods (in which incommensurability is thought to occur). Normal science, by contrast, is
considered a °cumulative enterprise" (Kuhn, 1962, p. 52).
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FRED KROON / ROBERT NOLA
RAMSIFICATION, REFERENCE FIXING AND
INCOMMENSURABILITY
Abstract. Though Kuhn and Feyerabend introduced the idea of referential Incommensurability, mang haue
found their account problematic. Subsequent developments in Sie theory of reference which address some
of these problems are reviewed here, from the Kripke and Putnam semantics to the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis
account of theoretical terms with recent moditications due to Papineau. However Stich argues that such
theories of reference can do no work towards solving issues in the philosophy of science. To overcome this
objection, and to remedy some remaining shortcomings in the Ramsey apparatus used, we provide some
epistemic conditions tot naming. The resulting account yields a less problematic understanding of incommen-
surability, one that is consistent wich realism.
This essay is an excursus into the topic of how to understand theoretical terms and the
way they refer, and the kind of pitfalls that they face - specifically, the danger of
incornmensurability as theories change. The first section of the paper traces some ofthe
history of the problem beginning with Kuhn's and Feyerabend's introduction of the
notion of incommensurability. In section 2 we briefly mention the theory of reference
developed by Kripke and Putnam for natural kind terms which allows much theory
change without referential variance. However, the causal theory of reference they
develop does not provide us with an account of how non-observational terms get their
reference fixed - the focus of this paper. In section 3 we move away from pure causal
theories to those which re-introduce an element of descriptivism in the reference fixing
definition, suggest a schema for defining some terms and discuss a number of cases
which fit the Schema or a modified version of it. Bot this is not intended as a general
theory of reference. In subsequent sections we explore what such a theory might be like
that arises from Ramsey's suggestions about defining theoretical terms. We give our
reasons for by-passing Carnap's development of Ramsey's suggestions (section 4), and
focus an Lewis' account (section 5) which is more directly concemed with how
theoretical terms can be defined. In section 6 we discuss Papineau's further tripartite
partition of the sentences of a theory into those which are, are not, or might be, involved
in reference fixing. But as useful as this distinction is in providing notions of referential
determinacy and indeterminacy, the distinction itself proves to be undermotivated.
Orte aspect of incommensurability that Papineau addresses is how, with change in
theory, we draw a distinction between (a) referring to the Same things but changing our
beliefs about those things, and (b) referring to quite different things. According to
Papineau we may have reached a point where we have run out of further semantic facts
to help us decide, and that we ought to look to the sociology of the use of terms within
a given scientific community to teil us how a conununity has decided between (a) and
(b). This Stich finds tongenial because he finds the distinction between (a) and (b)
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